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Recent Developments in Federal and State Rules
Pertaining to Medical and Scientific Expert
Testimony
James E. Starrs*
It is decidedly a pleasure being with you. This occasion presents me with a unique and ideal opportunity to address many
different issues with respect to forensic science in the presence
of the gatekeepers of scientific evidence-the decision-makers. I
am tempted therefore to be encyclopedic in my comments and,
even more so, in my criticisms on the subject. As a lawyer and a
forensic scientist I shall attempt to reign in my overpowering
inclination to take this opportunity to pontificate on subjects in
the forensic sciences that gnaw away at me on a daily basis.
My earliest formal connection to the forensic sciences occurred
in the late 1960's when the forensic sciences graduate program
was initiated at George Washington University at the suggestion
and the invitation of the FBI. As the law school representative
on the founding committee I became keenly aware of the need
for a more expanded education in the forensic sciences. This
impetus for education was conceived by the planning committee
to know no bounds. All persons in the legal and scientific systems were to be its beneficiaries.
Unhappily there are those who have learned about forensic
science only from the portrayal of it in Hollywood. For example,
I recently purchased the movie Presumed Innocent. I am sure
many of you have seen it. It was adapted from a book of the
same name written by Scott Turow, a lawyer. It is just one of an
unholy number of movies that have misrepresented the proper
uses of forensic science. These movies I have dubbed
"Hollyweirds," for that is what they truly are. Forensic science
cannot be learned from the silver screen.
* Professor of Law and Professor of Forensic Sciences, The George Washington University. Distinguished Fellow, American Academy of Forensic Sciences; Coeditor, Scientific Sleuthing Review; Co-author, Scientific Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases (1995).
Copyright 1996 by James E. Starrs. Reprinted with permission.
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In Presumed Innocent, for example, an issue is raised concerning a fingerprint on a glass at the murder victim's apartment which had the distinctive friction ridge minutiae of the
prosecuting attorney, Rusty Sabich. To Hollywood the glass
proves not only that Rusty was present at the scene but also
that he was the murderer. What Hollywood, and the lawyer-author, fail to realize is that a fingerprint cannot be scientifically
time-dated. Thus the fingerprint could have been placed on the
glass at some time other than the occasion of the murder when
Rusty was on the premises with consent and without a murderous intent. In other words, the evidence of Rusty's guilt from the
fingerprint on the glass is not so air-tight after all.
In addition to this exercise in fingerprint scientific hocus-pocus the scenario included a number of others amounting to scientific foll-de-roll as well. Rusty's wife, in an effort to pin the
murder on her husband when she was in fact the murderess,
plants evidence on the deceased woman which she expects will
do her husband in. The evidence is a mixed stain of vaginal and
seminal fluid that she has retrieved from herself after having
had sex with her husband.
The difficulty here is that Rusty's wife would have had to be
well-trained in biological stains and their forensic analysis to
have perfected her plan. How did she know that Rusty was a
secretor? What did she know of the A-B-Q blood types of the
three persons involved? Remember, this was all in an era just
prior to the coming of DNA analysis. The wife's concoction was
doomed from the outset, that is if Hollywood had cared the least
about the veracity of the scientific issues that it derived from the
book.
This is the kind of absurdity that one would expect from Hollywood, am I not right? But then again only a professorial pettifogger like myself would make much of Hollywood's peccadillos
in this connection. I suppose, in all truth, I am fated, as a professor, to be a professional picker of nits. And, to your misfortune, I have combed the Pennsylvania cases with the same nitpicker's eye in preparing my remarks to you today. I have
searched high and low in Lexis and Westlaw for decisions at the
appellate level, in the Superior Court and Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, in which I could glean references to Frye v. United States' or to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,'
since these are the foundation stones upon which the judicial

1.
2.

293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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edifice of forensic science has been constructed. It could well be
that there were other cases that did not refer to either Frye or
Daubert which my search terms would have caused me to miss.
Indeed, one decision at the appellate level in Pennsylvania on
the question of the admissibility of scientific evidence came in
Commonwealth ex. rel. Riccio v. Dilworth,3 back in 1955, well
before Frye became established here by reason of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania's opinion in 1977 in Commonwealth v.
Topa.4 Dilworth did not refer to Frye as a controlling precedent.
And yet it is a Frye case by any stretch of judicial reasoning and
in fact, in Topa it is referred to as an indication of the trend, at
least at that time, in Pennsylvania cases.
It gives me more than a moment of unease to realize that I
am lecturing in the home of Commonwealth v. Westwood,' in
which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1936 gave its approval to the paraffin glove test as an acceptable scientific method to determine whether a person had fired a gun or not. Now
that case is, to put it mildly, an atrocity on the face of forensic
science. The high court of Pennsylvania considered a positive
color reaction in the then-called "paraffin glove test" for gunpowder residues to be conclusive evidence of the existence of gunpowder residues on the hands of an individual. From that the
court extrapolated that the individual must necessarily have
fired a weapon.
What was wrong here was that the paraffin glove or more
appropriately the diphenylamine reagent test was then and is
now only a screening test for nitrates or nitrites and not specifically for gunpowder to the exclusion of other sources of nitrates
or nitrites. Moreover, even the finding of gunpowder on the
hands of a suspect is no certain evidence that he has fired a
weapon. He could have touched a weapon; he could have been in
the presence of a weapon when it was discharged or he could
have had gunpowder residues transferred to his hands from
another person who had fired a weapon.
What was particularly unique about the Westwood case was
that an expert testified for the defendant. That is a rarity, as
you know, in criminal cases involving persons of little means. In
addition, the expert very competently pointed out that there are
twenty-three other commonly encountered substances other than

3. 115 A.2d 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955) (excluding polygraph testing in a robbery case).
4. 369 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1977) (excluding voice spectrography evidence in a first
degree murder case).
5. 188 A. 304 (Pa. 1936).
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gunpowder that could have caused the same color reaction, including urine, lawn fertilizers and so many others, cosmetics,
etc. Twenty-three others, think of that.
In the aftermath of Westwood, and in the embarrassment
created by it in the scientific community, there were studies conducted testing the confirmatory value of the diphenylamine
reagent for gunpowder. As a consequence of those studies the
whole scientific community has reacted with more than uncomfortable chagrin to the outcome in this case. As a result, testing
is no longer for gunpowder residues but for the primer residues
of barium, antimony and lead. Westwood forced a change in the
scientific community's thinking and methodology because it was
a decision that was such outrageous scientific flap-doodle that
measures had to be taken to remedy it and to save face in the
scientific community.
In today's world of forensic science whenever an admonition of
caution is uttered on the question of the reliability of scientific
evidence, it is always Westwood that is cited as the worst example of science gone awry in the courts. No one wants to be
caught walking in the footsteps of Westwood.
And yet that is precisely what happened in Commonwealth v.
Browdie, in 1995, a case which saw the reappearance of the
flaw that prevailed in Westwood. Browdie involved the tragic
death of a child whose death was said to have been the result of
child abuse, in part involving a blow to the abdomen resulting in
trauma to the liver. The defendant, Browdie, the step-father of
the child, was charged with the asphyxiation of the child after
extended brutalization.
The trial took place in Allegheny County. Browdie was convicted of murder in the third degree. The scientific evidence that
was adduced was of great and serious concern to me for it
seemed to verge on being totally speculative.
A hospital pediatrician, Dr. Davis, testified that there was
evidence of child abuse. This conclusion was reached from the
elevated liver enzymes detected in tests of the child's blood. To
support this position a scientific article was introduced concerning a study on the matter.
Apparently the deceased child's elevated liver enzymes could
not be correlated with a laceration of the liver, observable by a

6. 654 A.2d 1159 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (admitting evidence of the correlation
between elevated liver enzymes and child abuse), afid, 671 A.2d 668 (Pa. 1996).
7. Pierre Coant et al., Markers for Occult Liver Injury in Cases of Physical
Abuse in Children, PEDIATRICS, Feb. 1992, at 274. My thanks to Judge Brosky of the
reviewing court for providing me with a copy of this article.
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CT scan or through the autopsy. Nevertheless, Dr. Davis was of
the opinion that the elevated liver enzyme levels in the deceased
child were a result of a bruise, not a laceration, to the child's
liver. Even though the reviewing court does not speak to the
issue, it is manifest that it had information that a CT scan had
not disclosed any laceration of the child's liver. What the autopsy might have revealed is not stated or even suggested.
The question before the appeals court was deceptively simple.
Do elevated liver enzyme levels, without the confirmation of a
laceration proved by a CT scan, signify that liver injury attributable to child abuse has occurred? The court refers to the article
from Pediatricswhich is said to support Dr. Davis' thesis. That
article referred to an evaluation of forty-nine juvenile patients
for possible child abuse. Of these, four had elevated liver enzyme
levels. Of these, three had confirmation through CT scans of the
existence of liver lacerations. The CT scan of the remaining one
"did not demonstrate a liver injury."' There is nothing, absolutely nothing, in this article to bolster the view that liver injury, not discernible on a CT scan, has occurred where elevated
liver enzymes are the only pathogenic finding. Yet Judge Elliott
of the Pennsylvania Superior Court found it to be "a logical
inference... that the fourth child (with the CT scan not disclosing any liver laceration) had the type of liver injury that would
not appear on a CT scan, such as a bruise." This inference is
stated in spite of the fact that the authors of the referenced
article conclude that "liver enzymes provide a means to screen
for unsuspected liver injury" while "the injury is documented by
the abdominal CT scan, which provides medical evidence of abdominal trauma inflicted on the child."9
Judge Elliott's view reiterates and acquiesces in that of Dr.
Davis, and neither is supported by the referenced article nor by
prior scientific articles on the subject." Clearly the most that
could be said of the elevated liver enzymes found in the deceased child was that they might have resulted from trauma to
the liver. Other causes, including trauma to other internal organs, could not be ruled out as a cause. The most that could be
scientifically said on this score was that the elevated liver enzyme levels were a presumptive, but inconclusive, sign of liver

8. Coant et al., supra note 7, at 275.
9. Id. at 277.
10. Halim Hennes et al., Elevated Liver Transaminase Levels in Children With
Blunt Abdominal Trauma: A Predictor of Liver Injury, PEDIATRICS, July 1990, at 87;
Allan Haftel et al., Abdominal CT Scanning in Pediatric Blunt Trauma, 17 ANN.
EMERGENCY MED. 684-89 (1988).
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injury.
As a presumptive test for liver injury the elevated enzyme
levels were no more persuasive of criminality than the diphenylamine reagent test in Westwood. The conclusions to be drawn
from both are of little assured reliability. And neither reaches
the level of proving that there was any wrongdoing necessarily
involved. Just as the existence of gunpowder on a suspect's
hands does not signify with apodictic certainty that he fired a
weapon, so too the fact of elevated liver enzymes does not prove
with any sure degree of scientific certainty that the cause was
attributable to child abuse.
It is abundantly clear that the Frye test of general scientific
acceptance was in no way satisfied by Dr. Davis' inconclusive
and challengeable musings on the matter. But, withal, the testimony was found to be unobjectionable.
Now the problem with that scenario is complicated by the
facts in Commonwealth v. Pestinikas.n This case arose in
Lackawanna County, and it has been in the courts and in the
news for years.
It has its start in 1986, when two people, Mr. and Mrs.
Pestinikas, were charged with homicide in the death of a ninetytwo-year-old man who had been given over to their care, and
who died of malnutrition and hypothermia because they didn't
care for him, so the prosecution alleged, even though they
agreed to do so.
My concern with this prosecution is not with respect to the
responsibilities under the common law to aid someone who is in
distress, either by contract or otherwise. My concern lies with
the evidence that came in on something of a collateral issue. It
turned out that somebody suggested that there should be an
exhumation of this ninety-two-year-old man for the purposes of
determining whether body parts had been switched. In other
words, whether the funeral director, who happened also to be
the defendant Pestinikas, in conducting the autopsy and preparing the deceased for burial, had in fact taken nice, young, vibrant, and new body parts and put them into the man's body to
show that it wasn't really malnutrition from which he died.
So the question was upon exhumation, when we find these
packaged body parts, are they the body parts of the ninety-twoyear-old victim or are they somebody else's body parts? And how
do we determine that? We determine it by DNA, and Dr. Edward Blake was called from California to come to the rescue.'
11.
12.

617 A.2d 1339 (Pa. 1992) (admitting PCR as to embalmed tissues).
Jean L. Marx, DNA Fingerprintingtakes the witness stand, 240 SCIENCE
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Dr. Blake reported that he found no evidence, through his
DNA testing, that body parts had been switched. When I heard
of this outcome I queried Dr. Blake by letter as to what studies
had been conducted on the effect of embalming fluid on DNA for
the purposes of conducting PCR analysis. His reply did not satisfy me that the forensic significance of the cross-contamination or
degradation of embalming fluid on DNA had been sufficiently
probed in the scientific literature.
Yet, in spite of the paucity of supporting studies Dr. Blake's
conclusion was taken as soundly based. It was, of course, within
the discretionary authority of the prosecutor to accept the report
of Dr. Blake. However, under Topa it certainly would lack scientific credibility in a court of law.
Now, admittedly, I am a Frye rule believer." It is my conviction that the courts should not hornswoggle, nor hogtie, scientific evidence but that careful and prudent restraints are necessary. I have seen altogether too many cases of the Presumed
Innocent type of foibles in the use of forensic science in the real
world of criminal cases for me not to be very skeptical of the
admission of scientific evidence without making it tow the scientific mark. What is not scientific to the generality of scientists
seasoned in the particular field of scientific endeavor should not
be scientific evidence in a court of law.
Frye is not the draconian, nor the austere rule that some
commentators and courts have made it out to be. The Pennsylvania courts, in theory wedded to Frye, have been quite casual
and liberal in applying it. The consequence has been that junk
science has found its way into the courts of Pennsylvania. The
decision in Commonwealth v. Graves4 is a dispiriting example
of the application of Frye in name only. I know the Graves case
well, having written an article in the American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology in criticism of it.'"
In Graves a baby sitter was alleged to have killed two children
by manually strangling them while babysitting for them. Part of
1616 (1988); Debra Cassens Moss, DNA- The New Fingerprints, 74 ABAJ. 66
(1988); Moody, DNA Analysis in Forensic Science, BIOSCIENCE, Jan. 1989, at 31.
13. See James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized:
A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMErRICS J. 249 (1986), cited
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993); James E.
Starrs, A Still-Life Watercolor: Frye v. United States, 27 J. FORENSIC Sci. 684
(1982).
14.

456 A.2d 561 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (admitting an odontologist's testimony

as a toolmark expert on fingernail markings on human skin).
15. See James E. Starrs, Procedure in Identifying Fingernail Imprint in Human Skin Survives Appellate Review, 6 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 171
(1985).
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the evidence against Graves was scratch marks on the neck of
one of the two deceased children. Scratch marks, not interpretable imprints. Odontologists of note in the American Academy of
Forensic Sciences and elsewhere, three of them in fact, were
called to testify that the scratch marks were made by the fingernails of the defendant Graves.
The opinions of the experts were alike in one respect. They
fudged in stating their conclusions as to whether the marks
were made by Graves' fingernails to the exclusion of anyone
else. The conclusions were framed in "bob and weave" terms, no
one being willing to be definite or emphatically and pellucidly
conclusive. It was "highly likely" and "highly probable" and even
within "a high degree of certainty" that Graves' fingernails had
left the scratch marks. But in the absence of any scientific literature on the subject the experts were playing it close to the vest
in stating their conclusions.
No expert was summoned to testify for the defense. The trial
court, apparently overwhelmed by the testimony of the
prosecution's experts, admitted the experts' evidence. The reviewing court affirmed that decision but not without slyly indicating that it had some reservations on the matter. The prosecution, as the appeals court viewed it, was not trying to associate
the scratch marks to Graves. No, indeed, the question was the
commonplace one of matching a weapon to a wound. As the
court put it, "we have a suspected weapon (here a fingernail)
and we wish to know the probability that the suspected weapon
inflicted the injury."16
This tenuous and unprecedented distinction was most puzzling. What the court was seeking to do was to perform the scientific gymnastic of flipping a dental analysis over into a ballistics determination. And that is precisely the problem here.
Odontologists are ever alert to the need to expand their scientific horizons beyond the reach of simple (or not so simple) dental
identifications. It is all a question of turf. The professional livelihood of odontologists is highly contingent on expanding their
turf to new fields of inquiry. And the Graves court let them do
that by letting the strictures of Frye pass by unregarded.
The fingernail to wound analysis allowed in Graves was merely scientific flotsam and jetsam afloat in but one court of law
until the coming of State v. Mark Charles Oppie.'7 In Oppie, Dr.
Michael West, a dentist by profession, had reported that the

16.
17.

Graves, 456 A.2d at 567.
No. 90-10,600(3) (Cir. Ct., Jackson Cty., Miss. 1991).
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wounds on the defendant Oppie's skin were "indeed and without
a doubt" produced by the victim, one Shumock. Fortunately that
report played no part in the case and did not enter into the
ultimate verdict. But it was made part of a grievance filed
against Dr. Michael H. West with the Ethics Committee of the
American Academy of Forensic Sciences."8 And that grievance
resulted in Dr. West's having lost his membership in the American Academy of Forensic Sciences.
Frye can just be misapplied as in Graves or it can be sidestepped as in Department of Environmental Resources v. Al
Hamilton Contracting Co.'" Frye will not control where it is
inapplicable. Therefore, to avoid the mandate of Frye, just find
that it is inapposite under the circumstances at hand. That is
what happened in Al Hamilton.
The issue before the court was the use of a computer to assist
in mapping a mine site. The computer had generated contour
lines which had then been superimposed on a map of the mine
site. The question was whether that use of the computer was
within the confines of scientific evidence or novelty as required
in order to apply Frye.
The court, in the first instance, said that this was a Frye issue
and that the computer usage did not satisfy the requirements of
Frye. On rethinking the subject the court reversed itself and
said that Frye was not implicated. The contour lines developed
by the computer constituted only demonstrative evidence like a
photograph or a skeleton brought into the courtroom. Being
demonstrative, Frye is not in question but the results of the
computer's creativity were nevertheless excluded since, as a
straightforward evidentiary matter, the computer's work product
was not sufficiently representative of the actual state of affairs
at the mine site. More than merely demonstrating the state of
affairs, it actually added its own creative imprint to it. It went
from a computer animation to a computer simulation.
Frye can be avoided in other ways as well. Since Frye is said
to be applicable only to scientific evidence, if the evidence can be
described as other than scientific in nature, then Frye has no
place in the admissibility equation.
Such a distinction with a difference can be made in the case of
using the computer to reconstruct crime scenes. Here the essential question is whether the computer only animates for demonstrative purposes the opinion of the expert or whether it goes
18. See Letter from John Holdridge to Douglas M. Lucas, Chairman of the
Ethics Committee (Jan. 22, 1992) (on file with author).
19. 1995 WL 536341 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
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beyond that and becomes the underpinning, indeed the entire
framework, from which and only through which the expert
reaches his opinion.
Take for example the computerized reconstruction which I
created of the Menendez brothers killing of their parents in
California. There was no way one could tell what the sequence
of the shots fired might have been nor from which gun the shots
were fired. The two sons entered the room where their parents
were watching television and just blazed away with the two
guns they had in hand.
Not knowing the factual details which a computerized reconstruction could legitimately demonstrate I put a smoke screen
around the happening in the room in which the killings occurred. I portrayed black smoke obscuring the visibility of the
event, rather than going on record, speculatively, in portraying
the details of the occurrence. However, I did show the executionstyle shots from Lyle Menendez when he returned to the room
after leaving momentarily to reload his shotgun. Those details
were matters not in dispute from the record.
The short of it was that I was demonstrating how the killings
were carried out through the usage of demonstrative evidence.
That is not, it seems to me, the kind of usage that should be of
concern under Daubert,Frye or other standard of the admissibility of scientific evidence.
However, when I effected a computer reconstruction of Dr.
Frank R. Olson's going to his death out of the thirteenth floor of
New York City's Hotel Statler, I created a computer simulation,
not an animation. Dr. Olson had been the unwitting victim of an
LSD experiment, courtesy of the CIA. The question before me,
after exhuming the remains of Dr. Olson from his grave in Frederick, Maryland, was whether Olson had plummeted to his
death on his own volition or because he was forced out of the
window due to the homicidal conduct of some third person or
persons. I called upon the computer wizardry of Engineering
Animation, Inc. of Ames, Iowa to assist me in resolving that
question.
At bottom I was anxious to see what the computer would tell
me had happened after I had incorporated into the computer
program various known facts and other facts based on principles
of physics. What might have been the horizontal velocity as
Olson went out the window? We knew where he had been found
on the sidewalk abutting Seventh Avenue in New York City. We
knew the dimensions of the window opening and the strength of
the glass, if he had gone through it. We also had calculated the
vertical distance that he had fallen. Assembling all the known
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data and utilizing the principles of motion we derived a computer reconstruction of the occurrence.
But this reconstruction was a simulation, rather than an
animation, and therefore was on a different legal footing from
the animation I had accomplished, also with Engineering Animation Inc., in the Menendez killings. As a consequence, the
admissibility of it before the fact finder would be a most telling
concern under any rule for the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Frye, as I have said, has often been seen as too rigorous to be
tolerable. In part that viewpoint has turned the switch that
started the quest for a new rule, a new rule which we now have
in Daubert. But is Daubert being interpreted with an open and
welcoming mind or is it being applied with a squinty-eyed skepticism toward science, be it old or be it new? The recent federal
district court opinion in Williamson v. Reynolds" has given
Daubert a quizzical twist that Justice Blackmun, its draftsman,
may not have anticipated or even desired.
What we have in the Williamson case is but one representation of an ongoing assault on forensic science under the supposed urging and imprimatur of the United States Supreme
Court in Daubert. Daubert has clearly made the subject of the
admissibility of scientific evidence a tabula rasa. Until the dust
settles in the courts we will be quite unsure where Daubert will
lead (or is it rather regress?).
Williamson involved a murder in Oklahoma and a successful
prosecution for murder in the Oklahoma state courts. The first
feature of this case worthy of note is that this is a federal habeas corpus petition from a conviction in the state courts. What is
the federal constitutional issue, for without one the dispute
would not be justiciable in the federal courts?
The constitutional issue revolves around the hair analysis
presented by the Oklahoma State Crime Laboratory during
Williamson's trial for murder. And, yet, knowing that, we can
still properly ask-what's the fuzz? The prosecution's expert had
testified that the hair found on the victim was consistent with
originating with Williamson. It was not said that the hair came
from the defendant to the exclusion of everyone else, for they
could not scientifically go that far. Basically, without indulging
in the disputatious matter of hair analysis statistics, the expert
was only saying that the hair could have come from Williamson.
How that created a federal constitutional issue worthy of a fed-

20.

904 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
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eral court's attention defies explanation.
Nevertheless, the habeas corpus petition was granted because
the testimony of the state's expert did not comport with Daubert.
This opinion was indeed a first in many ways. It was the first
time that hair analysis had been constitutionalized. It was the
first time that a federal court had mandated that a rule exclusively of federal evidence would control in a state court's prosecution. It was the first time that the careful and prudent testimony on the limits of hair analysis by an expert had been found
totally wanting in acceptability. Whether the decision portends
further inroads under the supposed aegis of Daubert remains to
be seen. As of now we know that Williamson is distinctly a mark
of disfavor toward test results which are less than conclusive.
Are we now on the verge of extirpating all presumptive tests
from the courts under the guise of a Daubert rule designed to
liberalize the rigidity of Frye?
Another presumptive test which has come on hard days in the
court is the use of the luminol reagent as a presumptive test for
the presence of blood."' This catalytic test is very sensitive and
can be carried out rapidly and even by persons unschooled in its
scientific properties.
When Judge Ito at the murder trial of O.J. Simpson ruled
that the results of luminol testing would be inadmissible without
proof that further confirmatory tests had been performed he was
not breaking new decisional ground. The Arkansas appellate
courts had preceded him in this negative judicial attitude to
luminol testing results.
What was the cause of this disapproval of luminol testing
results, one might rightly ask? The simple explanation is that
luminol, being but presumptive of the presence of blood, is not
certain enough for judicial tastes. Would this reasoning then
make all presumptive testing subject to challenge, where no
confirmatory tests had been the sequel? Think of all the on-thestreet drug screening tests that are conducted by the police on a
day-to-day basis. All of these tests are akin to luminol testing.
They are color reactions of a very sensitive nature but they are
also all presumptive, giving no assurance that the interpretation
of the results is correct.
Presumptive tests may be on the judicial ropes not only because they are too uncertain to be reliable, in the judicial mind,
21. See R.E. GAENSSLEN, SOURCEBOOK IN FORENSIC SEROLOGY, IMMUNOLOGY,
AND BIOCHEMISTRY 112-15 (1983).
22. See Brenk v. State, 847 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. 1993); but cf. United States v.
Burks, 36 M.J. 447 (C.M.A. 1993).
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that is, but also because they are perceived to have an unacceptable level of subjectivity involved in their interpretation. Subjectivity, the antipode of scientific objectivity, is anathema to the
truly scientific way of doing business. On that there is no dispute. But there is subjectivity and there is intolerable subjectivity.
All scientific testing bears the imprint of operator subjectivity,
more or less. It is when subjectivity becomes rank speculation
that there is just cause for judicial angst. So when a forensic
pathologist emotes in a confessional-like way that he has performed thousands of autopsies over the years but he now wonders whether his opinions, based on nothing more than his experience, are worth crediting, the pathologist's troubled ruminations are misplaced.23 Experience can be the bedrock for a scientific evaluation so long as the experience is not simply that of
the blind leading the blind.
This judicial and scientific soul-searching does credit to
Daubert when it is not carried to paranoid extremes. To see
judges and scientists alive to the compelling need for a constant
critiquing of scientific evidence can only be salutary and beneficial to the truth in science when and if that critiquing is kept
within bounds.
In that regard Daubert can be faulted for placing its emphasis
exclusively on scientific methodologies, leaving scientific conclusions to fend for themselves without judicial intervention. The
limited question which Daubert committed to judicial
gatekeeping was whether the testing method was in good scientific form-in the abstract rather than as applied. Consequently
the fact that a responsible scientific method resulted in an unjustifiable unscientific conclusion is beyond the ken of judicial
control, at least through Daubert's reasoning. Such a view is
nothing but errant nonsense on high.
However, Daubert does give some unbleached hope that the
opinion of the expert and not alone the method employed by him
will be a relevant matter for judicial scrutiny. Daubert does have
a "fit" requirement by reason of which the opinion and the method must be compatible with each other. More than that the opinion is not to be judicially recognized if it is not reasonably the
product of the method giving rise to it.
The Federal District Court of New Hampshire was eminently
correct to disallow the expert testimony of an ophthalmologist
23. James E. Starrs, A Time to Reflect, 19 SCL SLEUTHING REV. 14 (Summer
1995), discussing Gee, Reaching Conclusions in Forensic Pathology, 12 MED. SCI. L.
11-16 (1995).
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who proposed to testify that the defendant, Hoffmann-LaRoche,
Inc., could be held accountable in damages for manufacturing
the prescription drug accutane since it had a direct causative
influence on the development of the plaintiffs cataracts.24
The deficiency in the plaintiffs expert's proposed testimony
lay in his not having connected his experimental models to his
conclusion. The court was willing to agree that some photosensitive drugs can, if they become photobound to the lens of the
eye, produce cataracts. But that was not to say that accutane
was proved to have that result, nor in what therapeutic dosage.
The expert's method was not in serious question, except as to
how it related to the expert's conclusion which he wished to
express in open court. Even though the focus of Daubert is on
the scientific method in question and its reliability, still the
conclusions drawn from it and the opinions based upon it are
not irrelevant considerations. The reliability of the method is
determined, in the first instance, by whether it supports the
opinion which is predicated on it. A method is not considered in
the abstract but rather only in relation to the opinion which is
said to be derived from it. The theory underlying a method is
great coffee-house conversation among scientists, but if it bakes
no loaves, if it does not produce verifiable results, then it has no
place in a court of law. This is the "fit" requirement of Daubert.
And, as Forrest Gump was wont to say, "that's all I have to
say about THAT."
Before continuing in a somewhat different vein, I should like
to point you to a very excellent book for general reading on the
subject of scientific evidence. I refer to Hard Evidence which is
authored by a journalist, not a scientist, but, notwithstanding, it
is a readable and legitimate recital of a variety of aspects of
testing in the forensic sciences, albeit according to the gospel of
the FBI.
The focus of any rules of admissibility for scientific evidence is
in my view the imperative necessity of keeping the courts from
being contaminated and overrun by dinosaurs of the Steven
Spielberg order. The unarticulated concern25 is that the courts
will play the willing host to fantasies and fictions that parade as
qualified scientific methods. Steven Spielberg could use the
process of recombinant DNA for the purpose of reconstituting
the long vanished dinosaurs and the public might be taken in by
the belief that it is possible for science to do that. But what is
24. See Grimes v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 33 (D.N.H. 1995).
25. The Supreme Court in Daubert never mentions dinosaurs or for that matter what is its equivalent "junk" science.
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good entertainment in a movie theater or on the silver screen is
not therefore also legitimate fare for the solemnity of a courtroom. Judges must be ever mindful that the dinosaurs of an
imaginative Steven Spielberg do not invade the courthouse.
In Virginia recently, however, exactly the opposite result transpired. The case involved a hunter and in that regard puts one
in mind of an earlier incident in Virginia that has certain similarities. It seems that a hunter from down-state Virginia was
charged with killing his mother-in-law. He did kill his motherin-law. Of that there was no doubt but he sought to excuse the
killing as entirely accidental. As he told his version of the killing, he was vigorously chasing a racoon around his garage with
an axe when he finally cornered it and gave it some twenty or so
chops with his axe when, all-of-a-startle, he realized the racoon
was in reality his mother-in-law, his 270 pound mother-in-law.
One wonders whether there might be a scientific expert lurking
out there someplace who might be inveighgled into testifying
that there might be a credible psychological behavior pattern
which would cause a man with an axe to mistake his mother-inlaw for a racoon. Far-fetched, you say. You can think so only
because you are not immediately familiar with the recent decision from the Virginia Court of Appeals in Farley v Commonwealth.26
The facts in this case involved a hunter, not of racoons or
mothers-in-law, but of wild turkeys. If the pun is not too tasteless (as most are anyway), Farley, the wild turkey hunter, made
a turkey of himself by shooting another hunter instead of a wild
turkey. Farley was charged with involuntary manslaughter since
his mistake was said to have been exceedingly reckless. On the
contrary, Farley said he had little or no choice in the matter
since the psychology of hunters and hunting was such that his
mind was in a state of "closure" when he shot and killed his
fellow hunter. To back up his argument Farley called an experimental psychologist who was accepted in the trial court as an
expert on "closure."
The expert was proffered to testify that closure "is the tendency of the brain, when in receipt of ambiguous stimuli, to complete an image for the person based on the ambiguous stimuli
even though the image does not actually exist."27 The short of it
was, according to the expert, that closure deprived Farley of the
ability to have any conscious actions at the time of the shooting.

26.
27.

458 S.E.2d 310 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
Far/ey, 458 S.E.2d at 312.
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His mind caused him to play the part of an automaton. Certainly, in the expert's view, Farley was not behaving like a reckless
human being or even as a responsible hunter, for that matter.
The trial court, applying Virginia's permissively lax standard
of admissibility for expert testimony, found the expert's proffered
evidence to be relevant and, as such, admissible. As the trial
judge pithily put it, the expert "knew what he was talking
about."28 The prosecution did not contest these judicial pronouncements but argued that the jury was perfectly able to
decide the issue of recklessness without the aid of the defense
psychologist. The trial judge, apparently agreeing with the prosecutor, declared the expert's testimony to be inadmissible as a
matter of law.
On appeal to the Virginia Court of Appeals, that decision was
reversed and a new trial awarded to Farley. The appeals court
viewed the expert's testimony as helpful to the jury and, consequently, no usurpation of the jury's decision-making function.
The jury, it was surmised, might not have fully appreciated how
Farley might have misidentified the hunter as a turkey and how
he might have been convinced that he was shooting at a turkey
and nothing but a turkey. It was not only that the hunter's eyes
might have played tricks on him but his mind might have had
no capacity to control what his eyes saw. It could be this "psychological phenomenon" which was responsible for the hunter's
death, not Farley's reckless misjudgment, or so the jury might
properly find.
Farley's defense was a novel excuse and the scientific evidence
was equally novel. But beyond-the-bleachers excuses for criminal
acts are blooming crazily throughout the land. According to lawyer for the high and mighty, Alan Dershowitz, there is an "excuse abuse" afoot in the land. California's Menendez brothers
won a retrial for their brutal murders of their parents after they
raised the sordid spectacle of their having been the victims of
their parents' abuse. In South Carolina, Susan Smith claimed
her homicidal action in drowning her two children was programmed by the sexual abuse her father had inflicted on her
many years before. That excuse may have influenced the jury in
deciding against imposing capital punishment upon her for her
murderous behavior.
Farley, in essence, claimed he had made an honest mistake.
Honest mistakes do happen. There is no doubt of that. Take the
case of the irate apartment dweller in New York City who pro-

28.

Id. at 313.
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tested her neighbors' notifying the police that the odor of a putrefying dead body was wafting from her apartment. Dutifully,
the summoned police broke down the door of the offending
apartment and found to their olfactorial chagrin that the smell
that had been attributed to that of decaying human flesh was
but the malodorous aroma of the apartment occupant's cooking
her dinner. The consequences of that honest mistake were unfortunate, but forgivable. Farley's mistake was of a different
order entirely and the result of it was no laughing matter. Only
the authorized testimony of his expert had a jocular quality,
making light of the standard of admissibility and poking fun at
this dinosaur of scientific evidence.
In Daubert, we find that Frye is described as an "austere"
standard. I take it that austere means strict or rigid. And yet,
around the country, we have some courts saying, when asked to
accept Daubert and reject Frye, that Daubert is even more austere, even stricter than the Frye standard. But there is at least a
standard when you apply Daubert or Frye.
In Virginia, on the other hand, the relevancy rule calls the
shots. The relevancy rule means that literally anything goes. If
it is of some, even though paltry, significance in assisting the
jury, if it has some impact, it is admitted. I suppose, therefore,
the Arkansas case was wrongly decided, in Virginia's terms
anyway, when it excluded a hydrologist's evidence to the effect
that swimming in the treacherous currents of the Arkansas river
is risky business. Anyone not totally out of his mind would know
that it does not take an expert to tell you that it is dangerous to
swim in a fast river like the Arkansas River. You do not need an
expert to tell you that, and therefore, he provides no aid to the
jury in quoting what everybody already knows. But, under the
rudderless relevancy standard, all doors are open and all gates
are unlocked.
Some of the federal courts, which had previously distanced
themselves from Frye and had adopted a much more open-gate
policy under a relevancy criterion, have continued their old
ways, even in the new and more demanding era of Daubert. The
Third Circuit has taken such a grudging attitude toward
Daubert and United States v. Velasquez9 is illustrative.
Velasquez came on the heels of (or was it rather in the wake
of) United States v. Starzecpyzel ° from the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York in 1995. The issue
29.

64 F.3d 844 (3d Cir. 1995). See James E. Starrs, In the Wake of Harbor

Pilots, 19 SCI. SLEUTHING REv. 1 (1995).

30.

880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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in Starzecpyzel was whether handwriting experts are experts
within the meaning and language of Daubert. The federal court
refused to credit handwriting experts with being scientists. They
were akin to "harbor pilots," according to the court.
I have not surveyed document examiners who identify handwriting querying them on whether and to what extent they take
umbrage with the federal court's characterization of them. One
can expect, however, that handwriting analysts will be nonplussed, even outraged by the court's analogizing them to harbor
pilots. The harbor pilot analogy apparently stems from the
court's view that harbor pilots learn to avoid hazards by first
running into them. If they go aground, they know, therefore,
that they should not take that course in the future.
Such an approach to learning may be effective and practical
but it hardly qualifies as the epitome of the scientific method. It
is, on its face, a very empirical method of proceeding but without
a more scientifically structured design it suffers the fate of faltering as no more than an epigram. The more one errs, the more
one learns not to err.
Velasquez, then, tacked away from Starzecpyzel by giving
handwriting experts the benefit of the doubt when challenged as
engaging in non-scientific pursuits. However the Third Circuit
followed the conclusion in Starzecpyzel by treating such experts
as entitled to a less intense scrutiny under the relevancy standard of admissibility operative in the Third Circuit prior to
Daubert.
The pertinent issue in Velasquez was whether Professor Denbeaux of Seton Hall Law School should have been allowed to
testify for the defense in order to throw brickbats at the "field of
handwriting analysis." Denbeaux, along with Saks and Risinger,
had co-authored an article in the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review31 taking document examination to near fatal task
for not being properly scientific.
Professor Denbeaux was asked to testify for the defense that
the field of document examination should not be elevated to the
status of a science. He was also expected to detail the numerous
shortcomings in the field of document examination.
But Denbeaux was a lawyer who was out moonlighting as a
document examiner with an honesty chip on his shoulder. His
qualifications for his task as an expert were just a shade above
that of a well-read person. His major qualification was said to be

31. D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U. PA. L. REV.
731 (1989).
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his eight years of self-study. Of course, his co-authored article
also stood him in good stead as an expert.
The Third Circuit stated that under its pre-Daubert relevancy
standard, it could be responsibly found that Professor Denbeaux
would aid the jury in their coming to a sustainable conclusion.
The court reversed the failure of the trial court to let him testify
and remanded.
This admissibility of the scientific evidence world is a wild but
not so wondrous one. Things seem to go bump in the night
whether a court follows Frye or the federal standard-bearer in
Daubert or the relevancy standard of the Third Circuit and in
Virginia. It is enough to make the inclination to paint crazyquilt patterns on one's bedroom wall a temptation too overpowering to resist.
Q. Let me ask you with respect to the trial, how does a trial
judge avoid the possibility that in denying the defense in a criminal case the opportunity to present bogus scientific evidence the
trial judge will chance the real likelihood of reversal on appeal
due to the protected right of the accused to present evidence in
his behalf?
A. There are two ways to approach a reply to your wellconceived concern. First it must be recollected that the United
States Supreme Court has not constitutionalized the matter of
expert testimony. Certainly Daubert is not founded in any federal constitutional right. Nor has the Supreme Court given any
substantial credence to the argument that the right to present
testimony in one's own behalf should prohibit the court from
excluding defense submissions even where they are total
bunkum.32
A second way to approach the problem of the dread of appellate review and reversal is to note that the standard of review of
a trial judge's decision on the matter of the admissibility of scientific evidence is not to henpeck the trial court with a de novo
review. The standard of review in Pennsylvania is clear or manifest abuse of discretion, and, therefore, appellate review in a de
novo fashion is passe. Consequently what you do at the trial
level, whether it is to admit or to exclude, under the Pennsylvania cases, is most likely to be upheld in the appellate courts. I
say most likely because some of the appellate decisions are to
the contrary.
Judges are to be reminded, if reminding is at all necessary,
that although they do not have plenary and unreviewable power

32.

See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
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they do have sufficient authority over the management of a trial
to impose reasonable limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence so long as they are within the spirit of the criteria they
are implementing. I am pondering the California experience
with its Kelly-Frye rule, now known only as the Kelly rule, for
the admissibility of scientific evidence.
California has given birth to many things, some good and
more questionable or bad. One distinctly California rule that
sides with the good is the requirement under Kelly that both
sides be heard through their respective experts on the question
of the admissibility of the novel scientific testimony which is
before the court. Thus if an expert appears to testify that a newfound electrophoretic technique is worthy of acceptance, both
sides must be heard on the issue.
This prerequisite is undoubtedly very hamstringing. What it
says, in effect, is that there must be an equilibrium, that for
every scientific exhortation of a new technique there must be
found some review at odds with it.
So, for example, when Topa speaks to the need to produce a
scientific article in support of a novel technique, that is only half
a loaf in terms of presenting convincing evidence of general
scientific acceptance of a novel scientific technique. Even an
article concededly in a peer reviewed journal is not thereby
blessed with scientific acceptance unless and until the peer review has resulted in a meaningful reevaluation of the premises
and conclusions of the article by the relevant scientific community. Publication in a peer reviewed journal is just submitting your
work and its product to critiquing by your peers. The article is
meaningless as a sign of scientific acquiescence in it until it is
tested by its readers.
But suppose the scientific readers who staunchly oppose the
position of the peer reviewed article do not have the time or the
driving inclination to write and respond to the article. It is always possible that the article is viewed as scientific drivel about
which any sensible person, like the reader, would give as little
attention as the pedestrian does to the expansion cracks in the
sidewalk. As a result the negative side of the article is not exposed to view.
A court has the authority to remedy this deficiency in peer reviewed publications by insisting upon the adversarial approach.
In most jurisdictions a trial judge is authorized to appoint an
independent expert at county expense to assist the judge in
evaluating the novel scientific evidence. That, of course, quite
obviously is backstopping the judge at the trial level to show
that you did not abuse your discretion and that you went the
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full mile for purposes of making a determination of the legitimacy of the evidence that is being admitted.
It is as rare as finding an elephant on the Aran Islands to be
witness to a defense attorney who produces an expert in support
of his indigent client where the expert's fees are not compensable by the state or locality in which the trial occurs. Most criminal defendants are indigent or at least functionally so and thus
most defense attorneys do nothing to find and secure expert
testimony for their clients since compensation from the locale is
either not forthcoming or so paltry as to be insufficient to employ an expert who can do anything more than put a scarecrow's
fear in the prosecution.
Even more unusual is the defense attorney's producing an
expert who will testify that a new scientific evidence is acceptable and will result in freeing the accused. One of the main
bones of contention on the part of myself and others in the field
relates to the impossibility of getting defense attorneys geared
up to utilize scientific evidence. If they do, like Barry Scheck
and Barry Neufeld, the results render their appearances most
ethical and most imperative.
Q. In Pennsylvania, it's my recollection that just about anybody can qualify as an expert, that's a problem because people
come in to testify and there are cases where medical expertise is
absolutely required because a jury is presumed not to understand those problems. But when it's all finished, if again the
jury is charged by the judge that it can disregard all of that
because it is the fact-finder and it should make the decision.
And the other problem you can have is that you can always get
two experts fairly equally qualified on either side to testify exactly to the opposite.
A. Well, that's the hired gun routine, I suppose that's true.
Q. It is true, we see that all the time, but it's a problem when
you put this before a jury of lay people.
A. Well, you're asking the elemental question and that is--is a
jury competent to make the determination when there are competing claims made from the scientific community? And the
answer to that in my view is a resounding no.
I have excogitated on the workings of juries for years. In fact,
I was a participant in the Supreme Court of the United States
in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,3 involving the question of the
right to a jury trial for juveniles. I was asked by the National
Council of Juvenile Court Judges to act as an amicus for them

33.

403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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and I did, and I provided an argument for the Supreme Court of
the United States against a jury trial. To some the jury, especially in criminal case, is the palladium of liberty. But in
McKeiver the Supreme Court said that there is no constitutional
right which requires that a jury be provided for a juvenile tried
as a delinquent in a juvenile court.
No one wishes for the demise of the jury, nor could those
wishes come to pass. It is enough to instruct and inform the jury
and to give them enough information so they can make that
impossible decision which is an intelligent one. Admittedly, I am
not so hide-bound and ivy-twined to think that with professorial
pedagoguery to lead it that juries can winnow out the truth in
the facts presented to them. Jury competence in the presence of
scientific evidence is no greater than that of judges and lawyers.
It is a will-o'-the-wisp.
Who are qualified to be expert witnesses in matters scientific
is another concern that bulks large on the expert witness front.
Even before one reaches the issues of the reliability of a scientific method, the qualifications of the expert witness on the subject
are immediately confronted. There is nothing in Daubert which
directly addresses the question of qualifying the expert. Yet it
has been a part of the decisional progeny of Daubert to envelop
every jot and tittle of science in the courtroom under the sweeping umbrella of Daubert.
Numerous federal cases subsequent to Daubert have looked at
the qualifications of experts to testify. The intense scrutiny
given to that concern arises from a misplaced understanding of
Daubert. Daubert, in this context, has given rise to a form of
scientific expert overkill.
As the argument has it, if the expert must aid the jury by the
expert's testimony, then that aid is patently lacking if the expert
is not qualified. The aid to the jury rationale for the Daubert
decision then expands its horizons to include the judicial close
monitoring of the qualifications of expert witnesses.
There is a suggestion, only the merest aberrant hint, that
Pennsylvania will follow those federal decisions that give
Daubertfree reign on the issue of expert witness qualifications. I
refer to Al Hamilton, where a dissenting judge propounds the
view that Frye is dead and Daubert controls in Pennsylvania.
There is absolutely no justification for hinting, much less saying,
that Frye is dead, long live Daubert in Pennsylvania jurisprudence.
The pervasive influence of Daubert is seen in a federal district
court opinion from New York involving a motion to change ven-
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ue.' Such a motion is a most unlikely venue for a Daubert application but there it was in all its tenacity. The question was
whether the proceedings should be tried in Wisconsin rather
than in New York. The argument on behalf of the motion was
that New York experts are partisan and biased. They were purported to be guns for hire. But in Wisconsin, on the contrary,
where the air is as clear of ethical contaminants as that in nearby Lake Wobegone, the situation would be improved as the experts would be as pure as the air.
The motion was granted. The movant's reasoning prevailed.
Daubert dictated that the venue be changed. But hold! Daubert
speaks not one whit to the issue of expert witness bias. Yet
Daubert is being given the treatment of a smorgasbord. It is
being used for every purpose under the sun. Is it that trial judges have taken their newly-authorized powers too unsparingly?
Daubert has its limits, but the cases do not give any comfort to
those who would define its limits.
Another application of Daubert which, on reflection, is not
entirely surprising extends its reach to the practical application
of the method under review for its reliability. It is one thing to
say that a methodology must be in good scientific form to be a
reliable measuring rod in the legal arena. It is another thing
entirely to say that a reliable method can become unreliable if it
is not performed according to the rules of Hoyle, or whomsoever
names the rules of the game.
Every method may have one or more procedures or protocols
for its proper performance. A variance from the chosen protocol
indicates that the method has been compromised and its results
are not reliable. Nothing is said or intimated in Daubert as to
whether its strictures apply only to a method in the abstract or
a method in the concrete, viz. Whether it was conducted in compliance with the established protocol. That a method is nothing
but unreliable if its protocol is not adhered to point by point is
indisputable. Yet Daubert leaves this obvious fact unarticulated
and unrecognized.
For example, in examining the remains said to be those of
Jesse James which I had exhumed on July 17, 1995 from Mount
Olivet cemetery in Kearney, Missouri we came upon a bone
fragment from the area of the left occipital of the skull. Under
X-ray the bone fragment displayed a radio-opacity that led me to
believe there was a deposit of lead on it. There is an established

34. Max Planck Gesellschaft Zur Foederung Der Wissenschaften E.V. v. General Electric Co., 858 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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and very specific test for lead which I decided to call upon to
resolve the question of whether lead was in fact on the bone.
The test to be used is called the sodium rhodizonate test. It is
a two-step procedure according to its standard protocol. After
performing the first step and finding the result to be positive, I
was encouraged to believe that the trace element on the bone
was lead. But without carrying the test through to the second
step the positive reading on the first step could mean either that
lead was present or that strontium or barium or even antimony
was the cause for the color reaction.
One of my fellow laboratory workers, observing the result on
the first step, remarked: "Ali, Prof., you know it is lead. Forget
it. How many times have we done this test and it always turns
out to be lead if the first step says it might be lead." I refused to
heed the siren call to deviate from the protocol. The second step
soon followed and it also gave the appropriate color reaction
indicating that lead and nothing but lead was present on the
tested area of the bone fragment.
With that information in hand the issue now became one of
interpretation. What did the presence of the lead on the inner
surface of this occipital fragment signify? Was the lead that of a
bullet that had lodged there after circuiting his skull? Or was
this possibly a trace of lead sheared off a bullet as it exited his
skull at this location? The interpretation now took precedence
but only because the two-step procedure had been followed to
the letter.
The point is that the methodology for the proper use of sodium rhodizonate in testing for lead is well recognized and must
be adhered to at all costs to give a reliable result. The protocol
literally called the shots. And none of the shots would be off the
target if the protocol ruled the day in the laboratory in this
specific instance. The acceptability of the methodology of sodium
rhodizonate testing could mislead one into acquiescing in its
results where, in point of fact, the test as conducted involved a
short-cut. Short-cutting from two steps to one short circuits the
results of the testing in science and should also do so in a court
of law.
Adherence to a laboratory protocol can also be bound up with
the professionalism of the laboratory and its personnel. Once
again take an example from my investigation into the identity of
the remains exhumed from the grave in Kearney, Missouri. The
overriding question was whether mitochondrial DNA profiling
could establish a match between the bones from the grave and
the known matrilineal descendants of Jesse James. In the first
testing the bones from the gravesite were found to be too de-
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graded to enable Dr. Mark Stoneking at Penn State to sequence
the DNA. He then went to the teeth seeking a sequencible pattern. Note that the whole blood from the known descendants of
Jesse James' sister Susan Lavinia was at all times present in
storage in the Penn State laboratory of Dr. Stoneking.
Why did Dr. Stoneking not simply sequence the samples of
blood from the known relatives and then seek to match that to
the DNA from the teeth? That would seem to be the simpler and
less time-consuming way to make a decision on the identity of
the remains from the grave.
That was not done because we did not want to implant in the
mind of the laboratory operative the knowledge of what Jesse
James' true mitochondrial DNA looked like. To do so would have
injected a highly subjective element into the testing, giving good
cause to be skeptical of the results.
Of course it could be argued that adherence to the laboratory
protocol is just fodder for cross-examination on the weight to be
attributed to the results. Suffice it to say in answer to this suggestion that when a deviation from the protocol renders the
results useless for scientific purposes, then they should have no
value in law either. Certainly it would grant an arrogant power
to the jury to allow it to choose to give weight to an opinion
drawn from fatally flawed scientific testing. And yet in the federal circuit courts there is a clear division of authority at present on whether Daubert,when applied to DNA profiling, should
or should not require that the protocol for the testing have been
followed slavishly in order for the method itself to be deemed to
be reliable. 5 The Daubert guidelines give no guidance on this
question, except to say that the guidelines are not exclusive of
other judicially-imposed guidelines.
Q. Why would there be a dispute between the federal circuits
dealing with what sounds to me to be a common-sense understanding that the protocol is important?
A. Just as we have a question of interpretation in the case of
the bone fragment from Jesse James, so the federal courts have
been ceded considerable authority by Daubert to interpret it on a
day-to-day, methodology-by-methodology manner.
In addition one must recall that the time consumed at the
trial level in reviewing the adequacy of the laboratory testing
will necessarily involve more than a few ticks of the courtroom
clock. The expenditure of inordinate time on the question could
35. See United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
performance according to the protocol only goes to the weight of the evidence not its
admissibility). Contra United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1993).
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well move one court to a restrictive interpretation of Daubert.In
addition, whereas one decision on the merits of a methodology
will give a degree of precedential permanence to the matter in
subsequent litigation, a decision in one case that a laboratory
held fast to its protocol is of no value in deciding whether to
probe the matter in a different case at a future time. Courts can
take judicial notice that DNA has reached a level of assured
respectability in the scientific community and that will end the
matter in future litigation. But there can be no judicial notice
that a laboratory's protocol will or will not be given full blown
and conscientious attention on any occasion.
Q. Are the courts so scientifically literate as to be adequate
gatekeepers?
A. The question of greatest significance, at once troubling and
formidable, in the application of any rule of admissibility of
scientific evidence caparisoned as scientific is whether judges, be
they appellate or trial judges, are equal to the task of keeping a
sextant's measure of the distance between science which is good
and that which is no more than hocus-pocus. The decisions that
I have witnessed from the courts at every level are not just
cause to be sanguine on this matter of judicial competency in the
face of novel scientific evidence come knocking at the courthouse
door.
One of the most ubiquitous and perplexing conundrums in all
of forensic science concerns time dating. Pathologists are constantly hectored for a statement of their opinion on the time of
death of the deceased. Fingerprint examiners and police evidence technicians are forever giving their opinion on the freshness of latent prints. 6 Document examiners and chemists now
enter the lists with their insupportable efforts to time date the
writing7 on documents through various methods of accelerated
3
aging.

All of the major areas in the no man's land of forensic science
concern time dating. How long has blood been on an object? How
long does it take blood to dry? Lizzie Borden's trial for the murder of her father and step-mother hinged on matters as esoteric
and controversial as these. Time dating has not escaped the
attention of the United States Supreme Court. In 1974 thenJustice Rehnquist wrote an opinion indicating that the police
had stopped a car and had discovered a homicide victim's, one
36. See, e.g., Hale v. State, 1995 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 226 (Ala. Crim. App.
1995); State v. Cline, 909 P.2d 1171 (Mont. 1996).
37. See Charles Midkiff & James E. Starrs, Ink Dating-In the Footsteps of
Cold Fusion?, 18 SCI. SLEUTIUNG REv. 1 (1994).
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Lanzi's, dead body. According to Justice Rehnquist, the police
found a second gun, "also recently fired," a short distance from
Lanzi's remains.
Recognizing that there is nothing in firearms analysis or in
chemical testing that will enable scientists to say whether a gun
was recently fired, I decided to probe the background of the case
in an effort to determine the basis for the "recently fired" comment of Justice Rehnquist.
A gun can be found smoking or it can be warm to the touch.
These are non-scientific means of determining that it was recently fired. But, other than such non-scientific circumstantial
evidence one should not hurry to science for a quick fix on a
better means to assess the recency of a gun's firing. Of course it
was always possible, although exceedingly unlikely considering
the non-scientific source of the comment, that Justice Rehnquist
was on to something that scientists themselves have been unable to unpuzzle.
Sensing that the Supreme Court had merely reported on a
scientific breakthrough that I had somehow missed in the literature, I decided to probe the background of the investigation, trial
and conviction of the defendant in this prosecution in the state
courts of Massachusetts. In the opinion of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Tribunal it was said that a Harrington &
Richardson handgun was found in or about the place where the
victim's body had been located. It was also said that the gun had
been buried at that site.
The plot thickened since it was now seen that the gun in
question was not only recently fired but it was buried and in
rusty condition when it was recovered back in 1974. It seemed
quite implausible that the gun could have been determined to be
recently fired when it was found buried and rusted, causing the
weapon to be fouled by burial artifacts.
My skepticism of Justice Rehnquist's statement having been
quickened, I probed more deeply into the record at the trial in
Massachusetts. I located the recorded testimony of William
Cummings, the firearms expert who testified for the state at the
murder trial. Cummings said nothing on the matter of the time
dating of the firing of the buried weapon nor could he. He had
received the Harrington & Richardson revolver, so he testified,
in "a very dirty and rusty condition." That condition would have
prevented any testing of the weapon for the time when it was
last fired, even if such testing had any recognized scientific stature.
Having found nary a word in support of Justice Rehnquist's
"recently fired" statement in his opinion for the United States
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38 I decided to
Supreme Court in Donnelly v. DeChristoforo
throw caution to the winds and to beard the lion, so to speak, by
writing to Justice Rehnquist for the wherewithal of his "recently
fired" comment. My letter was sent on September 2, 1983. In
due course (on September 20, 1983) I received a reply from Justice Rehnquist. In it he apologized for a memory lapse on his
part of the underpinning for the remark by him in question.
Since so many years had passed since his decision in Donnelly
he indicated that he was "sorry to say that I simply have no
independent recollection of the basis for the statement in the
opinion to which you refer."
I toyed with the idea, but only for a moment, of riposting to
the Justice that, in the absence of his "independent recollection,"
I would be willing and ready to hear his "dependent recollection." Needless to say I did not reply in any way, shape or form,
prudence having gotten the better of me. However, I was sorely
pressed to fire off a riposte that resipiscence is a virtue even in
judges.
But if the Justice, now Chief Justice, was wrong in his statement that the gun was found to be "recently fired," how is it
that the appellate court decisions are replete with references to
firearms experts having testified that a gun was determined to
have been "recently fired?" Surely it is not Justice Rehnquist
who was in error, but yours truly in stating that a gun cannot
scientifically be said to have been "recently fired."
Au contraire! Just as there is a plethora of legal legerdemain,
so too there is an equivalent in obfuscatory scientific mumbojumbo. In science as in law words can have a meaning all their
own, which meaning will not at all necessarily correspond to the
meaning the common, but educated, person would ascribe to
that word. "Recently fired" is a telling and head-scratching example.
When an expert expostulates that a gun was "recently fired,"
the expert is referring to the gun's last thorough cleaning. "Recently fired" can be translated as follows: The gun in question
has been "recently fired" since it was fired since its last thorough cleaning. Now that statement is not only patently obscure,
it is painfully misleading.
Take for example a gun that was provably cleaned in all respects one year ago. Assume that there is no evidence of any
other or further cleaning of the weapon from that date to the
present. If a person has been shot by that gun but we know only
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that the shooting occurred some time within the last year, even
possibly one day following the gun's thorough cleaning a year
ago, then it is permissible, in firearms' experts lore, to say that
the gun was recently fired. Poppycock! Arrant nonsense! Deceptive balderdash! Verbal scamming! And whatever other pejorative comes to mind.
If the United States Supreme Court, being the Homer of the
judiciary, can nod through error, can the state courts be expected to perform more acceptably when confronted by the miasma
of scientific evidence?
State v. Aubert39 is a particularly distressing case from the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire. It is an accepted canard
among the populace, and among some scientists as well (but not
many), that righthanders will fire a gun with their right hand
and left handers will shoot with their left hand. The dominant
hand is the preferred shooting hand and shooting does not occur
ipsi-laterally. Such is the common refrain upon which the defense theory in Aubert was founded.
Under the facts presented in Aubert we learn that a wife went
to a party which her husband, to her knowledge, was attending.
While at the party and in the presence of a number of persons
the wife put a gun to the husband's head and pulled the trigger.
But for some fortunate but inexplicable reason the bullet, having
penetrated the husband's skull, did not kill him. He survived to
be a witness at his wife's prosecution for assault with intent to
kill.
At the wife's trial the focus of attention was predominantly on
her intention at the time the gun went off. Did she intend to kill
or was her intent less minatory? Was she just partying around
in a risible but dangerously scary way?
The defense called an expert, a firearms expert, who proposed
to testify that the wife, being right handed, and having held the
gun in her left hand when it discharged, could not and did not
intend to kill at that time. The trial court rightly viewed this
supposedly expert testimony as just so much scientific hogwash.
It was deemed to be both beyond the competence of the firearms
expert to speak to that question and beyond the competence of
his profession to emote on the subject, there being no scientific
foundation for such an opinion. The short of it at the trial was
that scientific fol-de-rol was unacceptable no matter how gussied-up.
A conviction having been returned, the wife appealed to the
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New Hampshire Supreme Court which reversed the conviction.
Evidence had been tendered that the shooting was accidental,
said the court apparently referring to the firearms expert, consequently the trial court was in error in failing to instruct the jury
that it was entitled to find that the shooting had not been intentional.
Here was a trial court judge who was right on the money,
scientifically speaking, but the reviewing court erred grievously
in giving credence to the bunkum of the firearms expert. In
disgust and dismay with this reviewing court's opinion, I pen
this clerihew:
The New Hampshire high court
found firearms not its forte.
So to a weapons expert it turned
Who, for better or worse,
It should have spurned.
As the saying among ballpark-goers has it, you cannot know
your players without a scorecard. Similarly you cannot know
your scientific experts without understanding the rudiments of
their specialty. One of the fundamentals of any professional
discipline is the definition of its scope and purposes as well as
by the training in the subject undertaken by its practitioners.
We know, for example, that a graphologist is not a document
examiner because we realize that, by definition, a graphologist
determines the personality of the writer of a document but a
document examiner eschews that topic as he or she would the
plague.
Yet, the Ninth Circuit, the same circuit out of which Daubert
erupted, in a 1972 opinion' refused to express an opinion on a
matter it deemed to be within the purview of graphology since it
could "profess no expertise at graphology."4' Not only was the
court lacking in knowledge of the tenets of graphology, it was
also seemingly unaware that Webster's and any other commonly
encountered dictionary defines "graphology" as related to detecting personality traits from handwriting. The question before the
court was entirely divorced from the issue of the personality of
the maker of the medical record in question. The issue was one
of an interpretation of the handwriting on the document as displaying a "50" or a "150." The task of piecing out that puzzle
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was appropriately that of a document examiner and inappropriate for a graphologist.
What happened in Kelly was bad but what happened in
Hooten v. State42 was ten tons worse. Hooten saw the transmogrification of a housewife into a polished document examiner, all
courtesy of judicial bootstrapping.
Marie B. Hill, the expert in controversy, was a housewife, a
high school graduate and a correspondence course graduate of
the grapho-analysis school in Chicago. Following her matriculation from her Chicago-based course, Mrs. Hill went on to appear,
so she testified in Hooten, in hundreds of trials in Mississippi as
an expert in document examination. Even though her credentials were sorely limited and then only to graphology, still she
managed to inveigle her way into testifying in numerous trials
as a document examiner, among persons who are to a person
repulsed by any affiliation their discipline is purported to have
to graphologists.
In the proffer of her testimony for the defense at the murder
trial of Hooten, Ms. Hill expressed herself as unfamiliar with the
standard texts in the field of document examination. She did not
know the leading names in the document examination field and
she seemed to preen herself in her refusal to be acquainted with
her chosen field and its leading lights. The trial judge, hearing
all of this high-handed nincompoopery, refused to allow the proffered testimony to be presented to the jury.
On appeal of the conviction to the Mississippi Supreme Court
the conviction for murder was reversed solely because the trial
court had disallowed Ms. Hill's testimony. Her practical experience and her frequent court appearances, it was said, had clearly qualified her to testify as an expert in this case. The case was
remanded for a new trial.
The Mississippi high court, like the New Hampshire high
court and the Ninth Circuit and numbingly numberless trial
courts throughout the country have, in Rumpole's felicitous phrasing, made a pig's breakfast of it in their interpretation and
understanding of forensic science. 'Nuff said on the subject, although the tale of woe could go on tiresomely.
What is the cause of this thusness?
Rarely does anyone delve into the raison d'etre for a special
rule governing the admissibility of scientific evidence. What is it
that lies at the heart of the concern, for concern it most certainly
must be, that any special rule simply reflects that the courts feel
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toward scientific evidence? Are scientists less worthy of belief
than non-scientists? Or is it the methods of scientists that pique
a court's conservatism?
Daubert is sated with word after word on the subject of the
scientist's method. Commonwealth v. Avellar,' decided in Massachusetts in the same year as Daubert, goes so far as to say
that Massachusetts' reliance on the Frye rule was moved by the
need to keep a weather eye out for "scientific testing methods"
rather than, more generally, for scientific evidence. Since Avellar
did not involve the results of scientific tests Frye was deemed inapplicable. Consequently an emergency room physician was
allowed to testify to his opinion that the defendant-father's reactions to the death of his infant child were not typical of a truly
grieving parent's reactions.
Is the judicial reaction to scientific evidence on a par with the
now disavowed past attitude of the courts to the claimed victims
of sexual offenses? If you will recall, the word of a rape victim
that she had been raped was, in the old days, never enough to
warrant a conviction of the pinpointed rapist. Corroboration was
the name of the judicial game in which the rape victim had become embroiled. The reason for the corroboration requirement
and the reason for its ultimate demise in rape cases was the
distrust of the word of the victim herself. Is there a similar attitude that prevails with respect to scientific evidence? Must scientists be corroborated, say by general acceptance of the relevant scientific community in a Frye jurisdiction or by reliability
guideposts as in Daubert, so as to be certain that they tow the
mark of integrity, honesty and all those other good things that
non-scientists are touted inferentially to have by their say so
alone?
I hesitate to voice the subject in this post-O.J. world, but are
the courts fearful that fabrication, fraud and lying lie in wait
whenever a scientist appears in court? Is there a perceived
anomic lawlessness in science that has gulled the courts into an
anti-admissibility reaction? Is that why we have a special rule
for scientific evidence? Horrors to Betsy, I hope not. Has it really
come to pass that not only are judges and lawyers out of touch
with science but they are also steeped in suspicion of it? Is such
an attitude prevalent? Does it explain the explosion downward
of interest in science in grade schools today? Has Armageddon
come again, this time for science and its products?
It may be that there are frissons of fear for the unknown in
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science which are conceived also to be unknowable by those
awash in the justice system. Over the years in testifying as an
expert witness and in coaching others in the how-to-do-its of
testifying as an expert I have been tempted to field an experiment which I instinctively feel needs no such experimental support. I believe I could walk away unscathed and unchallenged if
I were to say that the scientific instrumentation supporting my
opinion on whatever subject is up for judicial grabs was predicated on my use of the infrared luminometer interfaced with a
frangible collimator operated in the pulsed mode. I know that
that reminds one of the testimony of the FBI expert in that
Hollywood classic of courtroom comedy My Cousin Vinnie.
Just as the FBI man in the movie was too far out in left field
to catch anything but grief, so my instrumentation is equally unavailable for constructive use and is, in addition, intrinsically
self-contradictory. Take, for a moment, the frangible collimator
which if it were to exist would be a contradiction in terms. If
there were a frangible collimator, then there could also be a
square circle. To be frangible it is breaking the item under analysis into smaller components. To be a collimator it is collecting
and aggregating small pieces into a unit. You cannot have it
both ways. Either it is a square or it is a circle. Either it is frangible or it is a collimator. Never the twain shall meet, as the
saying goes.
Another reason, less often articulated, for the judicial lids that
have been placed on scientific jars is that the presentation of
scientific testimony takes a hellacious amount of courtroom
time. I call this the "logjam syndrome." It is rampant in hearings on motions in limine on the admissibility of scientific testimony, most particularly in California.
It may be that the courts have construed the need to get on
with it, in terms of the trial of cases in the courts. To that end
the rules are being cemented to keep a handle on the amount of
juror time which will be devoted to science in the courtroom. Let
the judge hear the arguments of counsel and their witnesses in
the spare environment of a pre-trial admissibility hearing but
save the jurors and the court's time from being consumed and
overrun by the miasma of scientific testimony at the trial when
the meat and potatoes are on the adjudicatory plate.
While on the subject of syndromes, there is another one at
large in this admissibility endeavor which I choose to term the
"mystique syndrome." It could also be called the "don't-let-thejury-be-taken-in syndrome" but that is an appellation that is so
pellucidly clear that it would put a halt to the felt need for any
further discussion of it. It is this fear that juries will be over-
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awed by the phantasmagora of science that seems to underlie
Topa. It also seems to be the loggerhead in Commonwealth v.
Nazarovitch" which admitted evidence of electrophoresis. In
other places this syndrome is called the problem of the mystic
infallibility that is accorded to the scientific enterprise. If nothing else, the verdict in the trial of O.J. Simpson knocked that
generality into a cocked hat.
For judges, especially at the trial level, the issue, in my view,
should be directed to the "whyness" factor rather than to the
criterion of admissibility. Why is there a need for a standard of
admissibility in this particular case? If a fracture match of glass
from a car in an automobile crash can be made in the courtroom
in the sight and sound of the jury should not the concern for the
jury's being hoodwinked be lessened? If so, should not the standard of admissibility be less rigid? The question of why should
always be a necessary prerequisite to the assignment of a criterion of admissibility. Finding the why then becomes the overriding and the sometimes quite thorny issue.
Finally, I should like to comment on another matter concerning the choices that we make. In science we look not only at a
hypothesis but at the null hypothesis as well. In brief, all sides
should be considered. The fingerprint examiner who looks only
for Dalton details which enable him or her to certify that there
are sufficient points of similarity to say there is an identification
to a particular person is not only short of the scientific mark but
is also doing a disservice to the scientific inquiry he or she is
performing. It is not only similarities that are under scrutiny
but dissimilarities as well. The possibility that there may be an
exclusion of an individual should be given equal scientific attention to that given to whether there is an inclusion of an individual. After all, fair is fair, which is to say that equal treatment is
a measure of the law in proper balance just as it is of science in
equipoise.
As a result of these ruminations it seems to me that too little
attention is being given to the "flip side" of the admissibility
coin. If scientists are being weighed in the balance, are we forgetting about the fact that non-scientists are coming more and
more to fill the gap left by junk scientists with their own lay
persons' form of junk science? The police officer who testifies to
the speed of the car without the scientific credentials to do so
and without buttressing by hard factual details from the scene is
indulging just as much in a foray into the junkery of science as
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true hooded and gowned scientists might. Say a police officer
identifies a controlled substance as marijuana because he or she
knows from experience, always long and always intense, that
when persons pass a cigarette butt from person to person to be
inhaled they are engaging in a communal marijuana smoking
event. Are we not concerned about the acceptance of this ribaldly ludicrous testimony as well as that of scientists?
I am not proposing that the scientist should have a standard
of admissibility as lax as that of the police officer. I am simply
pointing to the fact that maybe non-scientists who give expert
testimony should also bear the burden of measuring up to a
certain standard of reliability. Opinion testimony is opinion
testimony where spoken from the mouths of lay persons or scientists. Quite possibly the coming of the Daubert era, or is it a
millennium, will percolate over to root out fakery among other
supposed experts as well as scientists. I await the advent of
such an even-handed day. For now, however, I say with Forrest
Gump-"that's all I have to say about THAT."
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